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Backbone or Backyard of the Convention? 
The CISG’s Final Provisions
Ulrich G Schroeter *
InTroducTIon
The united nations convention on contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (cISG) has become the most successful uniform private law conven-
tion in legal history. Proof of this fact is two-fold; on one hand the large 
number of Contracting States that have ratified the Convention,1 and on the 
other hand – maybe more importantly – the increasing number of cases in 
which the cISG has been applied by courts and arbitral tribunals. The excel-
lent case collection that Albert Kritzer, in honour of whom this Festschrift 
submission was written, is tirelessly working on,2 bears witness to the con-
vention’s growing importance in legal practice.
The practical application of the CISG has been significantly facilitated 
by the impressive number of scholarly writings that have been dedicated 
to various aspects of the convention. While much has been written about 
issues addressed in Parts I-III of the convention (Articles 1-88 cISG), it is 
striking to note that only little attention has been paid to the convention’s 
Part IV, entitled ‘Final Provisions’ (Articles 89-101 cISG). A statement Pro-
fessor Winship made with respect to international uniform law conventions 
in general also holds true for the CISG: ‘No commentator – and I barely 
exaggerate – spends much time examining the “Final Provisions” of inter-
national conventions.’3 The primary reason for this apparent neglect seems 
* dr iur (Freie universität Berlin); Akademischer Rat, Albert-Ludwigs-universität 
Freiburg.
1  At the time of writing, the cISG had 70 contracting States. More are expected 
to follow.
2  Available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu.
3  Winship, P (1990) ‘Final Provisions of uncITrAL’s International commercial 
Law conventions’ (24) International Lawyer 711.
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to lie in the assumption that the cISG’s Final Provisions exclusively address 
questions of public international law, and are therefore of little (if any) in-
terest to international merchants, legal practitioners, courts and arbitrators. 
Articles 89-101 cISG, so it is said, are addressed to the States in their treaty-
making capacity,4 and many of the matters they concern are to be handled by 
government officers, rather than sellers and buyers.5 From the perspective of 
parties engaging in international sales contracts, Part IV of the cISG might 
therefore be viewed as the ‘backyard’ of the convention.
While it is true that the cISG’s Final Provisions are also dealing with 
technical issues raised by the Convention’s ratification as well as the related 
question which rights and obligations arise from the convention for the re-
spective contracting State,6 it would be incorrect to assume that these issues 
exclusively belong to the realm of ‘public international law’ and are there-
fore of no concern for the cISG’s practical application. A contracting State’s 
obligations arising from the cISG and the convention’s application through 
the courts of said contracting State are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. 
Professor Honnold has described this as ‘the commitment that contracting 
States make to each other: We will apply these uniform rules in place of our 
own domestic law on the assumption that you will do the same.’7
The CISG’s Final Provisions may accordingly have a significant influ-
ence on the convention’s applicability to a given sales contract, and will of-
ten need to be taken into account by commercial lawyers when dealing with 
the cISG. Their location in the concluding part of the convention should 
therefore not distract from the fact that many of the provisions in Part IV ad-
dress matters which are also regulated elsewhere in the convention: From a 
functional perspective, Articles 92-97, 100, 101 cISG belong to Part I, while 
Articles 92, 96, 100, 101 cISG in addition belong to Parts II and III. The 
4  Winship ‘Final Provisions’ supra fn 3 at 713.
5  cf Honnold, Jo (1999) Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 
United Nations Convention (3rd ed) Kluwer at para 458.
6  See Schlechtriem, P (1986) Uniform Sales Law – The UN-Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods Manz at p 22: ‘Part IV (Articles 89-101) 
contains in the Final Provisions the obligations of the contracting States.’
7  Honnold Uniform Law supra fn 5 at para 103.2. The application of the cISG 
does, one might add, not always have a public international law ‘side’ to it: the latter 
is missing whenever a cISG case is decided by either a court in a non-contracting 
State, or an arbitral tribunal.
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close connection that exists between Part IV and the other parts of the cISG 
becomes particularly obvious when looking at Articles 12 and 96 cISG: 
These two provisions deal with exactly the same question in exactly the same 
way, but have (for no apparent reason8) been placed into two separate parts of 
the convention.9 When discussing ‘Final Provisions’, it is therefore always 
necessary to look at the subject matter of each individual provision, and not 
merely at their location in Part IV of the cISG.
This article provides an overview of the most important questions that 
Articles 89-101 cISG have raised, and in particular focuses on those issues 
that have been discussed by case law.10
InTerPreTATIon oF ArTIcLeS 89-101 cISG
In order to be able to deal with pertinent issues involving the convention’s 
‘Final Provisions’, it it is first necessary to determine which rules govern the 
interpretation of Articles 89-101 cISG. 
Provisions Governing the Interpretation
In this respect, a number of different approaches have been advocated: While 
the majority of authors point to the public international law character of Part 
IV and argue that the applicable rules of interpretation are exclusively those 
provided for in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna convention on the Law of Trea-
8  For a discussion of the drafting history see Schroeter, uG (2005) UN-Kaufrecht 
und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht – Verhältnis und Wechselwirkungen Sellier 
european Law Publishers at § 8 para 27.
9  Article 12 CISG is, strictly speaking, superfluous; see Herber, R and Czerwenka, 
B (1991) Internationales Kaufrecht c.H. Beck at Art 12 para 5; Schroeter UN-Kauf-
recht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 8 para 27; but see ender-
lein, F and Maskow, d (1992) International Sales Law oceana at Art 12 no. 2.1.
10  note that the uncITrAL digest of case law on the united nations convention 
on the International Sales of Goods (published in 2004) does not cover the provisions 
in Part IV of the Convention. I have attempted to fill this gap by reviewing all relevant 
cases and arbitral awards listed in the Pace database (http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu): 
From a public international law perspective, Al’s collection of case law on the cISG 
is reporting on decades of treaty practice.
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ties of 23 May 1969 (thereby excluding the application of Article 7(1) cISG 
to Articles 89-101 cISG),11 others allow for a parallel application of Arti-
cles 31-33 convention on the Law of Treaties and Article 7(1) cISG.12 It is 
submitted that the latter approach should be followed, as Article 7(1) cISG 
explicitly demands that ‘[i]n the interpretation of this Convention regard is to 
be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in 
its application and the observance of good faith in international trade’:13 By 
using the term ‘this convention’, Article 7(1) cISG refers to the convention 
in its entirety (including its Part IV), as can be deduced from the terminology 
employed elsewhere in the CISG – whenever a CISG provision merely refers 
to a specific Part or individual article of the Convention, it specifically says 
so.14 Accordingly, Article 7(1) cISG governs the interpretation of Articles 
89-101 cISG,15 thus eg allowing recourse to these provisions’ legislative 
history in situations in which the more narrowly drafted rule in Article 32 
Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties would prohibit this step. The re-
siduary rules in Articles 31-33 Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties 
can, on the contrary, only be applied as far as their content is compatible with 
Article 7(1) cISG.16
11  enderlein and Maskow International Sales Law supra fn 9 at Art 7 no 2.2; Happ, 
r (1997) ‘Anwendbarkeit völkerrechtlicher Auslegungsmethoden auf das un-Kauf-
recht’ Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 376 at 377-378; reinhart, G (1991) UN-
Kaufrecht c.F. Müller at Art 7 para 8; Witz, W in Witz, W, Salger, H-c and Lorenz, M 
(2000) International Einheitliches Kaufrecht recht und Wirtschaft at Art 7 para 6.
12  Piltz, B (1993) Internationales Kaufrecht c.H. Beck at 66.
13  emphasis added.
14  See Article 12 cISG (‘Any provision of article 11, article 29 or Part II of this 
convention…’), Article 24 cISG (‘For the purposes of this Part of the convention’), 
Article 27 cISG (‘…in this Part of the convention,…’), Article 92(1), (2) cISG (‘…
Part II of this convention or […] Part III of this convention’), Article 96 cISG (‘…
any provision of article 11, article 29 or Part II of this convention…’) and Arti-
cle 101(1) cISG (‘…this convention, or Part II or Part III of the convention…’).
15  Schroeter, uG (2004) ‘The Status of Hong Kong and Macao under the united 
nations convention on contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ (16) Pace 
International Law Review 307 at 323, available at: http://www.schroeter.li/pdf/
Schroeter_16_Pace_Intl_L_rev_2004_307.pdf; Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Eu-
ropäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 8 para 31.
16  Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 8 
para 32.
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Language Versions of the Convention
A special question that may arise in the course of interpreting Part IV of 
the cISG is which language version of the provision should be looked to. 
Although often discussed in connection with Article 7(1) cISG, this issue is 
specifically addressed in the so-called ‘Witness Clause’ which concludes the 
Final Clauses of the CISG and specifies that (only) the Convention’s texts in 
the six official languages of the United Nations – Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, Russian and Spanish – are ‘equally authentic’.
This clause, which conforms to common treaty practice, should however 
not be taken at face value, because not all of the authentic language versions 
represent the decisions made by the convention’s drafters in equal measure: 
the english language was the one primarily used during the discussions in 
Vienna and, maybe more importantly, the only language used by the diplo-
matic Conference’s drafting committee which produced the final text of the 
provisions.17 The convention’s english text version should therefore, in this 
author’s opinion and based on Article 7(1) cISG, be accorded prevalence 
where it is in conflict with other language versions,18 as the latter are some-
times not more than less-than-accurate translations of the english version.19 
17  Schlechtriem, P in Schlechtriem, P and Schwenzer, I (eds) (2005) Commentary 
on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (2nd ed) oxford 
university Press at Art 7 para 22.
18  See Swiss Supreme court, 13 november 2003, available at: http://cisgw3.law.
pace.edu/cases/031113s1.html holding that the english version, and, secondarily, the 
French version are to be given a higher significance as English and French were 
the official languages of the Conference and the negotiations were predominantly 
conducted in english; Brunner, c (2004) UN-Kaufrecht – CISG Stämpfli at 554; 
diedrich, F (1996) ‘Maintaining uniformity in International uniform Law via Au-
tonomous Interpretation: Software contracts and the cISG’ (8) Pace International 
Law Review 303 at 317-318; Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commen-
tary supra fn 17 at Art 7 para 22; contra Flechtner, HM (1998) ‘The Several Texts of 
the cISG in a decentralized System: observations on Translations, reservations and 
other challenges to the uniformity Principle in Article 7(1)’ (17) Journal of Law and 
Commerce 187 at 208.
19  on the Spanish text of the cISG, see Barrera Graf, J (1982) ‘The Vienna con-
vention on International Sales contracts and Mexican Law: A comparative Study’ 
(1) Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 122 at 142. cf also the 
general remarks by Aust, A (2000) Modern Treaty Law and Practice cambridge uni-
versity Press at 203-204: ‘In practice the translations of multilateral treaties are done 
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This lack of exactness has also been tacitly acknowledged by the depositary 
of the convention (Article 89 cISG), who in recent years has published rec-
tifications of both the authentic Arabic and Russian text versions.20
reSerVATIonS
Among the thirteen articles that make up Part IV of the convention, the 
majority lay down one and the same type of final clauses: reservations. Ac-
cording to the definition in Article 2(1)(d) Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, a ‘reservation’ means a unilateral statement, however phrased 
or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving 
or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal 
effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State. 
The CISG’s Final Provisions authorize five reservations21 which a contract-
ing State may declare (multiple reservations are possible22): Article 92 cISG 
(entitling States to declare that they will not be bound by Part II or by Part III 
of the convention),23 Article 93 cISG (the so-called ‘federal state clause’, al-
lowing certain States to restrict the convention to only some of their territo-
rial units), Article 94 cISG (authorizing contracting States that have closely 
related legal systems to exclude application of the cISG to contracts be-
by translators who, though highly professional, will not have been at the negotiations, 
and may not necessarily appreciate all the nuances of the final text.’
20  Depositary notifications C.N.862.1998.TREATIES-5 of 19 February 1999 (procès-
verbal of rectification of the authentic Arabic text), C.N.233.2000.TREATIES-2 of 27 
April 2000 (rectification of the Russian authentic text) and C.N.1075.2000.TREA-
TIES-5 of 1 December 2000 (rectification of the original of the Convention [Arabic 
authentic text]).
21  This is at least the count favored by most commentators; see eg Flechtner ‘The 
Several Texts of the cISG’ supra fn 18 at 193; Torsello, M (2000) ‘reservations to 
international uniform commercial law conventions’ Uniform Law Review 85 at 91. 
others have pointed out that the declaration authorized by Article 93 cISG does not 
constitute a reservation stricto sensu, cf Aust Modern Treaty Law supra fn 19 at p 
170-171.
22  But see Torsello ‘reservations’ supra fn 21 at 116 (with a hardly convincing 
reasoning).
23  Lookofsky, J (2000) ‘The 1980 united nations convention on contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods’ in Blanpain, r (ed) International Encyclopaedia 
of Laws – Contracts Kluwer at para 328: ‘surely the most far-reaching reservation 
permitted’.
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tween enterprises situated in these States), Article 95 cISG (entitling States 
to declare that they will not be bound by Article 1(1)(b) CISG) and finally 
Article 96 cISG (authorizing States to exclude the application of the con-
vention’s provisions on freedom of form), with eleven reserving States the 
convention’s most popular reservation.24 Technical questions surrounding 
the making of declarations under the convention are governed by Article 97 
CISG, and Article 98 CISG clarifies that no reservations are permitted except 
those expressly authorized in the convention.
The fact that the convention allows for reservations at all has often been 
criticized for allegedly having both decreased uniformity and increased the 
likelihood of confusion regarding the application of the cISG.25 What is cer-
tainly true is that it is not always easy to determine the precise effect that a 
given reservation has on the convention’s practical application. The main 
difficulty results from the necessity to ‘translate’ a declaration under public 
international law – the reservation – into a language familiar to the commer-
cial lawyers and judges entrusted with applying the cISG. As will be dem-
onstrated in more detail below, most problems in this respect can be solved 
by staying true to the wording of the cISG’s Final Provisions. This approach 
usually leaves no room for calling upon the (residuary!) rules in the Vienna 
convention on the Law of Treaties which deal with reservations in general,26 
as these are being displaced by Articles 92-98 cISG.27
But: do the convention’s reservations in the past have really lead to 
non-uniformity and confusion? This question can only be properly answered 
24  Argentina, Belarus, chile, china, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Paraguay, russian 
Federation, ukraine. estonia’s initial reservation has since been withdrawn.
25  Bailey, Je (1999) ‘Facing the Truth: Seeing the convention on contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods as an obstacle to a uniform Law of International 
Sales’ (32) Cornell International Law Journal 273 at 311; Flechtner ‘The Several 
Texts of the cISG’ supra fn 18 at 193: ‘reservations have produced substantial non-
uniformity’.
26  cf Bridge, M (1999) The International Sale of Goods: Law and Practice oxford 
university Press at para 2.45.
27  For an approach similar to the one advocated here, see Bridge, M (2005) ‘uni-
form and Harmonized Sales Law: choice of Law Issues’ in Fawcett, JJ, Harris, JM 
and Bridge, M International Sale of Goods in the Conflict of Laws oxford university 
Press at para 16.122: ‘Whatever the impact of the reservations, they must first be 
interpreted to see how far they are intended to go’.
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by looking at the role that Articles 92-96 cISG have come to play in the con-
vention’s practical application by courts and arbitral tribunals.28
Conditions Under Which a Reservation May Be Made under the CISG
It first should be noted that not all reservations are open for every Contract-
ing State’s use: While some of the convention’s reservations can be declared 
by any State which so desires (Articles 92 and 95 cISG), others provide for 
certain conditions which need to be satisfied if a Contracting State wants to 
make use of the reservation (cf Article 19(b) Vienna convention on the Law 
of Treaties). 
Conditions Laid Down by CISG’s Reservations 
aRTIcle 93 cIsg
The ‘federal state clause’ in Article 93 cISG is only open to a State which 
‘has two or more territorial units in which, according to its constitution, dif-
ferent systems of law are applicable in relation to the matters dealt with in 
this Convention’ (Article 93(1) CISG). The term ‘territorial unit’ is flexible 
enough to include States, cantons, provinces, union republics,29 emirates, 
oversea territories or even Member States.30 commentators have convinc-
ingly stressed that Article 93(1) cISG requires that a certain independence 
28  The divergence between the (significant) attention that certain reservations have 
received in scholarly writing and the (limited) importance they have gained in the 
convention’s practical application is particularly striking when it comes to Article 
95 cISG: While this provision has been scrutinized with a truly frightening thor-
oughness, its practical impact (on Article 1(1)(b) cISG) is diminishing by the day, 
since Article 1(1)(a) cISG has long become the by far more important basis for the 
convention’s application. See Bridge The International Sale of Goods supra fn 26 at 
para 2.45: ‘The Article 95 problem is a dying one, the victim of the success of the 
cISG...’.
29  Herber and czerwenka Internationales Kaufrecht supra fn 9 at Art 93 para 2.
30  For a potential application of Article 93(1) cISG to Member States of the europe-
an communities see Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht 
supra fn 8 at § 19 para 32.
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of the ‘territorial unit’ is provided for in the State’s constitution itself,31 while 
it is insufficient that the power to legislate on certain matters has merely 
been delegated to a territorial unit. This interpretation is supported by both 
purpose and legislative history of the provision, which was intended to en-
able a State to accede to the cISG with respect to individual units, even if 
it is unable to do so for all of its territorial divisions as it lacks competence 
over the legal matters governed by the cISG.32 The relevant point in time is 
the moment the declaration is made, not the moment the convention enters 
into force for the declaring State. Accordingly, a declaration under Article 93 
cISG can also be made if the prerequisites described above have only come 
into existence after the State had acceded to the convention, eg because of a 
change to its constitution or because the State extended its territory by way 
of an accession of new ‘territorial units’. The latter has been the case with 
the People’s republic of china when Hong Kong and subsequently Macao 
became part of the Prc as ‘Special Administrative regions’.33
aRTIcle 94 cIsg
Article 94(1), (2) cISG restrict the contracting States which may avail them-
selves of the reservation to those ‘which have the same or closely related 
legal rules on matters governed by this convention’. While ‘the same’ legal 
rules can easily be construed as referring to uniform law in force in the coun-
31  evans, M in Bianca, cM and Bonell, MJ (eds) (1987) Commentary on the 
Interna tional Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention Guiffrè at Art 93 para 
2.1; Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary supra fn 17 at Art 93 
para 3; Sono, K (1986) ‘commentary on the convention on the Limitation Period in 
the International Sale of Goods, done at new York, 14 June 1974’ in uncITrAL (ed) 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law united nations at 107: 
‘an important qualification’ (on Article 31(1) of the UNCITRAL Limitation Conven-
tion, which served as a model for Article 93 cISG).
32  Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary supra fn 17 at Art 93 
para 1.
33  Schroeter ‘The Status of Hong Kong and Macao’ supra fn 15 at 321-322; see also 
the discussion infra at p  462-463.
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tries concerned,34 the term ‘closely related’ remains regrettably vague.35 The 
drafting history of Article 94 cISG provides no particular guidance either, 
as a variety of potentially covered cases were discussed: The most important 
one (and, indeed, the reason why the reservation had been developed in the 
first place) was the Nordic uniform sales law implemented by the Scandi-
navian States (which later became the only States to make use of Article 94 
cISG), but an envisaged uniform sales law between the Benelux countries 
(which never materialized) and the closely related legal rules in Australia 
and new Zealand were also mentioned.36 In the later academic discussion, 
Article 94 cISG was thought to be potentially applicable to the relationship 
between the united Kingdom and commonwealth countries which still have 
sales legislation modelled on the english Sale of Goods Act37 as well as be-
tween canada and the united States,38 but not to the countries belonging to 
the romanistic legal family (Italy, France and Spain).39
In the end, the line between (merely) related and ‘closely’ related legal 
rules remains difficult to draw. Article 94 CISG eventually provides little 
guidance in this respect. The preferable approach is therefore to accept that 
it is left to the States contemplating the reservation to decide for themselves 
34  It is submitted that uniform law conventions – which are the most important 
(although not the only) source of uniform law – may prevail over the CISG by way 
of Article 90 cISG, but may similarly be covered by Article 94 cISG; see Bridge 
‘uniform and Harmonized Sales Law’ supra fn 27 at para 16.126; enderlein and 
Maskow International Sales Law supra fn 9 at Art 94 no 1; Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht 
und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 10 para 14.
35  Torsello ‘reservations’ supra fn 21 at 95.
36  See delegates Fokkema (netherlands) and Bennett (Australia) in (1981) United 
Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 
March – 11 April 1980, Official Records, Documents of the Conference and Summary 
Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Main Committees united 
nations p 436. 
37  Winship, P (1983) ‘The Scope of the Vienna convention on International Sales 
contracts’ in Galston, n and Smit, H (eds) International Sales: The United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods Matthew Bender at p 
1-46.
38  Ziegel, J (1982) ‘The Vienna International Sales convention’ in Ziegel, J and 
Graham, W (eds) New Dimensions in International Trade Law: A Canadian Perspec-
tive Butterworths 38 at 52.
39  Torsello ‘reservations’ supra fn 21 at 95.
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what is to be considered as ‘closely related’.40 The vagueness as to this res-
ervation’s conditions is somewhat balanced by the requirement of a specific 
declaration (cf Article 97(2) cISG), albeit not completely: Practically speak-
ing, legal rules are closely related in the sense of Article 94 cISG if and when 
the reserving States declare them to be.
aRTIcle 96 cIsg
A declaration under Article 96 cISG may only be made by a State which, 
under its domestic legislation, requires written form for contracts of sale. 
From the wording of the provision alone it is not entirely clear what kind 
of domestic form requirements Article 96 cISG refers to: Some commenta-
tors argue that Article 96 cISG should not be read as imposing a particular 
threshold as to the required content and scope of domestic form legislation.41 
others convincingly stress that the requirement must basically exist for all 
contracts of sale and not merely for certain types, and point to the drafting 
history of the reservation:42 A netherlands proposal to let a limited domestic 
writing requirement suffice was discussed in detail at the Diplomatic Confer-
ence in Vienna, but eventually rejected.43
Legal Consequences when Conditions are not (or no longer) Satisfied
As has been demonstrated, most prerequisites mentioned in Articles 93, 94 
and 96 cISG pertain to the content of the domestic law of the reserving State. 
reservations, as the convention which they form part of, have a long life, 
40  Brunner UN-Kaufrecht supra fn 18 at Art 94 para 2; enderlein and Maskow 
International Sales Law supra fn 9 at Art 94 no 1; Magnus, u in (2005) J. von Stau-
dingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch: Wiener UN-Kaufrecht (CISG) 
Sellier-de Gruyter at Art 94 para 5.
41  enderlein and Maskow International Sales Law supra fn 9 at Art 96 no. 2; Tor-
sello ‘reservations’ supra fn 21 at 111. 
42  Garro, AM ‘The u.n. Sales convention in the Americas: recent developments’ 
(17) Journal of Law and Commerce 219 at 228; rajski, J in Bianca & Bonell Com-
mentary supra fn 31 at Art 96 para 3.1; Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer 
Commentary supra fn 17 at Art 96 para 2; Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches 
Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 6 para 303.
43  See Official Records supra fn 36 p 271 et seq.
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and domestic laws may change. This raises the following question: Which 
legal effect, if any, should a reservation have under the cISG if the require-
ments for making such a declaration were either not met to begin with or 
have disappeared at a later stage?
To this end, doubts have in recent years been expressed eg with respect 
to denmark’s reservation under Article 94 cISG (as denmark has refused 
to adopt modifications the other Scandinavian States have implemented into 
their domestic sales laws, arguably resulting in the danish law no longer be-
ing ‘closely related’ to the laws of its northern neighbours)44 as well as with 
respect to Argentina’s and chile’s reservations under Article 96 cISG (as 
neither the legislation in Argentina nor chile prescribes a mandatory written 
form for all sales contracts).45 Similar doubts have frequently been expressed 
about the Article 96-reservation made by the People’s republic of china, as 
china’s current domestic law no longer requires all international sales con-
tracts to be concluded in writing.46
Assuming for the moment that the assessments reported are accurate, 
what are the consequences for the application of the convention? While it 
has been suggested that a reservation must be considered ineffective when 
its conditions are not satisfied (and should therefore be disregarded by the 
courts),47 the opposing view seems to be correct: Article 97(4) cISG des-
ignates the (it is submitted, only) way by which a reservation’s effect may 
be removed, ie through its withdrawal by a formal notification in writing 
addressed to the depositary. The procedure provided by Article 97(4) cISG 
thus precludes courts in the various contracting States from making their 
own (and possibly divergent) assessments about the compatibility of national 
44  Lookofsky, J (1999) ‘Alive and Well in Scandinavia: cISG Part II’ (18) Journal 
of Law and Commerce 289 at 290.
45  Garro ‘The u.n. Sales convention in the Americas’ supra fn 42 at 229.
46  Wang, X and Andersen, cB (2004) ‘The chinese declaration against oral con-
tracts under the cISG’ (8) Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and 
Arbitration 145 at 152; Wu, d (2005) ‘cIeTAc’s Practice on the cISG’ Nordic Jour-
nal of Commercial Law issue 2005#2 at 12-13; Yang, F (2006) ‘The Application of 
the cISG in the current Prc Law and cIeTAc Arbitration Practice’ Nordic Journal 
of Commercial Law issue 2006#2 at 15.
47  Torsello ‘reservations’ supra fn 21 at 111 and 117; Wolff, L-c (2008) ‘Vr chi-
na: neue IPr-regeln für Verträge’ Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahren-
srechts 55 at 57 fn 38 (on the chinese Article 96-reservation). 
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laws with Articles 93, 94 and 96 CISG, and thereby avoids a significant legal 
uncertainty which might otherwise arise.48
Time at which a Reservation may be made
The convention’s reservations can be divided into two groups based on the 
time at which they may be declared: In accordance with the general rule laid 
down in Article 19 of the Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties, three 
reservations may only be made at the time of signature, ratification, accept-
ance, approval or accession (Articles 92, 93 and 95 cISG), while the cISG’s 
drafters have generously allowed two others (Articles 94 and 96 cISG) to 
be made ‘at any time’. Within their scope of application, Articles 94 and 96 
CISG accordingly provide the Convention with a greater flexibility in deal-
ing with future legal developments on a national or regional level, by leav-
ing room for an increasing regional harmonization in matters of sales law 
(Article 94 cISG)49 or for a later introduction of written form requirements 
into the domestic legislation of contracting States (Article 96 cISG).50 This 
arguably is a very useful feature, as it allows the Convention – which has oc-
casionally been criticized as resulting in a ‘petrification’ of the law of sales 
– to adopt to changing circumstances.
Legal Effects of Reservations made
Effect as to Subject Matter: Which of the Convention’s Rules are Modified?
aRTIcle 92 cIsg
The effect of an Article 92-reservation is to modify the application of the 
term ‘contracting State’ in both Articles 1(1)(a) and 1(1)(b) cISG: As, ac-
cording to Article 92(2) cISG, the reserving State ‘is not to be considered a 
48  See Wang and Andersen ‘The chinese declaration’ supra fn 46 at 163-164; Witz 
in Witz, Salger & Lorenz International Einheitliches Kaufrecht supra fn 11 at Art 94 
para 5.
49  Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary supra fn 17 at Art 94 
para 8; Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at 
§ 10 para 30.
50  enderlein and Maskow International Sales Law supra fn 9 at Art 96 no. 3.
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contracting State’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) cISG, Article 1(1)(a) 
cISG cannot lead to the applicability of the cISG’s rules where one of the 
parties to the sales contract has its place of business in the reserving State.51 
The convention is furthermore not applicable by virtue of Article 1(1)(b) 
cISG when the private international law rules of the forum declare the law 
of the reserving State to be applicable to the contract. It should, however, 
be noted that the effect which an Article 92-reservation has on Article 1(1) 
cISG is limited in two respects: 
First, the effect only extends to the Part of the cISG covered by the 
reservation made, ie either Part II (contract conclusion) or Part III (rights 
and obligations under a sales contract). If the reservation pertains to Part II 
(as all Article 92-reservations made until now do), it accordingly affects the 
applicability of Articles 14-24 cISG. But the reservation should, it is submit-
ted, be read as also extending to any ‘general principles’ underlying Articles 
14-24 cISG which, in accordance with Article 7(2) cISG, may be invoked 
eg where a contractual agreement has been reached without clearly identifi-
able elements of offer and acceptance.52 (A German court, however, has ruled 
otherwise.53) In Mitchell Aircraft Spares v. European Aircraft Service, a u.S. 
district court was faced with another question relating to the effect of an 
Article 92-reservation: When the reservation displaces the application of the 
convention’s rules on contract formation in favour of Illinois law which rec-
51  u.S. district court [n.d. of Illinois], 27 october 1998 (Mitchell Aircraft Spares 
v. European Aircraft Service), 23 F. Supp. 2d 915, available at: http://cisgw3.law.
pace.edu/cases/981027u1.html. But see oberlandesgericht naumburg (Germany), 27 
April 1999, available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990427g1.html: the con-
vention was declared applicable to a contract between a danish seller and a German 
buyer by virtue of Article 1(1)(a) cISG, and Articles 14-19 cISG were applied in 
order to determine whether a contract had been concluded – the Danish Article 92 
cISG-reservation was accordingly overlooked; oberlandesgericht Frankfurt (Ger-
many), 4 March 1994, available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940304g1.
html: Articles 14, 19 cISG were applied to a contract between a German seller and 
a Swedish buyer by virtue of Article 1(1)(a) CISG – the Swedish Article 92 CISG-
reservation was overlooked.
52  See Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary supra fn 17 at Intro 
to Arts 14-24 para 5.
53  oberlandesgericht München (Germany), 8 March 1995, Recht der International-
en Wirtschaft (1996), 854, available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950308g1.
html; cf Schlechtriem’s critique in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary supra fn 
17 at Intro to Arts 14-24 para 10: ‘unclear’.
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ognizes the ‘parol evidence rule’, should this rule – which generally is inap-
plicable in cISG cases54 – be applied to the contract formation at hand? The 
court answered in the negative and argued that the issue of parol evidence 
is addressed in Article 8 CISG, which – forming part of Part I of the CISG 
– remains unaffected by the declaration under Article 92 CISG;55 a possible, 
but certainly not the only imaginable result. It is furthermore interesting to 
note that a State declaring that it will not be bound by Part II will apparently 
nevertheless be bound by Article 29 CISG (governing modifications of con-
tract), as the latter provision is located in Part III of the cISG. This raises the 
question if an agreement under Article 29(1) cISG to modify, supplement or 
terminate a contract of sale will be subject to Articles 14-24 cISG, or if the 
reservation has to be read as also covering matters of contract modification. 
The wording of Article 92 cISG militates in favor of the former approach,56 
as does a comparison with the wording of Article 96 cISG, which explicitly 
speaks of ‘article 29, or Part II of this convention’.
Second, it has to be kept in mind that an Article 92-reservation does not 
affect Article 1(1)(b) CISG in situations where the conflict of law rules point 
to the law of another contracting State, which has not made a reservation 
under Article 92 CISG – in these cases, the rules of the Convention have to 
be applied,57 and at least one court in an Article 92 cISG-reserving State has 
done so.58
54  See cISG-Ac opinion no 3, Parol evidence rule, Plain Meaning rule, contrac-
tual Merger clause and the cISG, 23 october 2004 (rapporteur: Professor richard 
Hyland, rutgers Law School, camden, nJ, uSA), available at: http://www.cisg.law.
pace.edu/cisg/cISG-Ac-op3.html.
55  Mitchell Aircraft Spares v. European Aircraft Service supra fn 51 at 920-921.
56  Bergsten, e (2008) ‘Amending the contract: Article 29 cISG’ in this book at p 
54-55.
57  Brunner UN-Kaufrecht supra fn 18 at Art 92 para 3; enderlein and Maskow 
International Sales Law supra fn 9 at Art 92 no. 6; Lookofsky ‘Alive and Well’ supra 
fn 44 at 294; Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary supra fn 17 
at Art 92 para 3.
58  Østre Landsret (denmark), 23 April 1998 (Elinette Konfektion Trading ApS v. 
Elodie S.A.), [1998] Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 1092, available at: http://cisgw3.law.
pace.edu/cases/980423d1.html.
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aRTIcle 95 cIsg
The effect of a reservation under Article 95 cISG is to exclude the reserving 
State’s duty under public international law to apply Article 1(1)(b) cISG. 
The wording of Article 95 CISG, which – couched in classical public inter-
national law terms – entitles any State to declare ‘that it will not be bound 
by subparagraph (1)(b) of Article 1 of this convention’, makes amply clear 
that the application of Article 1(1)(a) cISG is e contrario not affected by the 
reservation: reserving States continue to be bound by this provision.59 Apart 
from this indication, Article 95 cISG provides little guidance to courts and 
arbitrators when it comes to determining the reservation’s exact effect on the 
Convention’s practical application, as it lacks a specific paragraph dealing 
with this question comparable to the ones that Articles 92-94 cISG have 
been endowed with. This difference in drafting style can be traced back to 
Article 95 cISG’s legislative history: The reservation was only included into 
the convention due to a last-minute decision in the Plenary conference,60 
which meant that its wording did not undergo extensive scrutiny in a drafting 
committee.
It is therefore not entirely surprising that different opinions have been 
advocated when it comes to the question whether the courts in a reserving 
State, even when – due to Article 95 CISG – not obliged to do so under 
public international law, are still entitled to apply the convention in cases 
in which the prerequisites of Article 1(1)(a) CISG are not fulfilled. The do-
mestic law of one Article 95 CISG-reserving State – Singapore – contains a 
specific rule through which the national legislator has explicitly excluded the 
application of the cISG in all cases in which Article 1(1)(a) is inapplicable.61 
But also in the united States, an Article 95 cISG reserving State that lacks a 
specific domestic law dealing with this situation, at least two District Courts 
59  u.S. district court [new Jersey], 15 June 2005 (Valero Marketing v. Greeni), 
373 F.Supp.2d 475, 482, available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050615u1.
html; Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary supra fn 17 at Art 95 
para 3.
60  See Official Records supra fn 36 p 229 et seq.
61  See Sub-section 3(2) of the Singapore Sale of Goods (united nations conven-
tion) Act: ‘Sub-paragraph (1)(b) of Article 1 of the convention shall not have the 
force of law in Singapore and accordingly the convention will apply to contracts of 
sale of goods only between those parties whose places of business are in different 
states when the States are contracting States’.
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have taken the same position and held that the only circumstance in which 
the cISG can be applied by a u.S. court is if all the parties to the contract are 
from contracting States.62 It is, however, important to note that there is noth-
ing in Article 95 cISG itself that would prevent a court in a reservation State 
from applying the cISG in cases in which its private international law (eg by 
honouring a choice of law clause forming part of the parties’ contract) points 
to a law of a contracting State: Article 95 cISG in itself merely excludes 
the reserving State’s obligation to do so, but leaves the ensuing question of 
how to determine the applicable law entirely to the domestic conflict of laws 
rules.63 If these lead to the applicability of the Convention – as they well 
may64 – this result is reached by way of the rules of private international law 
only, without Article 1(1)(b) cISG being involved.65 
aRTIcle 96 cIsg
There is disagreement about the precise effect of a reservation under Ar-
ticle 96 cISG, which entitles a contracting State to ‘make a declaration […] 
that any provision […] of this convention, that allows [… an …] indication 
of intention to be made in any form other than in writing, does not apply 
where any party has his place of business in that State’.66 one school of 
thought believes that in every case in which one of the contracting parties 
62  u.S. district court [S.d. Florida], 22 november 2002 (Impuls v. Psion-Teklogix), 
234 F.Supp.2d 1267, 1272, available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021122u1.
html; u.S. district court [W.d. Washington], 17 July 2006 (Prime Start v. Maher 
Forest Products), Internationales Handelsrecht (2006), 259 at 260, available at: 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060717u1.html. 
63  Brunner UN-Kaufrecht supra fn 18 at Art 95 para 1.
64  Ferrari, F (2006) ‘Short notes on the impact of the Article 95 reservation on the 
occasion of Prime Start Ltd. v. Maher Forest Products Ltd. et al., 17 July 2006 (IHr 
2006, 259)’ Internationales Handelsrecht 248 at 250.
65  Bell, GF (2005) ‘Why Singapore should withdraw its reservation to the united 
nations convention on contracts for the International Sale of Goods (cISG)‘ (9) 
Singapore Year Book of International Law 55 at 65.
66  See Honnold Uniform Law supra fn 5 at para 129: ‘The language of Articles 12 
and 96 has led to uncertainty…’. It has to be stressed that the present question turns 
on an interpretation of Article 96 cISG, rather than on Article 21 Vienna convention 
on the Law of Treaties, as the latter provision – if at all applicable – is residuary in 
nature; but cf Basedow, J (2006) ‘uniform Private Law conventions and the Law of 
Treaties’ Uniform Law Review 731 at 740-741.
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involved has his place of business in an Article 96 cISG reservation State, 
the writing requirements embedded in the law of that State apply.67 Accord-
ing to this approach, which has been justified with the acceptance by the 
convention of the need, felt by some States, for protection against claims 
unsupported by a written agreement,68 Articles 12, 96 cISG would result in 
the universal applicability of the reserving State’s national law on formal 
requirements, whenever a party from this State is involved. A number of 
chinese69 and russian70 arbitral tribunals (at least implicitly) seem to have 
adopted this view, when they naturally applied the writing requirement in 
67  Honnold Uniform Law supra fn 5 at para 129; reinhart UN-Kaufrecht supra fn 
11 at Art 12 para 3.
68  Honnold Uniform Law supra fn 5 at para 129.
69  See cIeTAc Arbitral Award, 31 december 1997 (Lindane case), available at: 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/971231c1.html: ‘when ratifying 
the convention, china denounced Articles 11 and 29 of the convention on forma-
tion, modification and termination of the contract, that need not to be concluded 
by means of writing. Therefore, the formation of the contract must be concluded 
by means of writing’; cIeTAc Arbitral Award, 17 october 1996 (Tinplate case), 
available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/961017c1.html: 
‘china made a reservation when signing the cISG, requiring written format’; cI-
eTAc Arbitral Award, 6 September 1996 (Engines case), available at: http://www.
cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/960906c1.html; cIeTAc Arbitral Award, 29 
March 1999 (Flanges case), available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/
cases2/990329c1.html: Form requirements in the ‘Law of the People’s republic of 
china on economic contracts concerning Foreign Interests’ applied to cISG con-
tract between Seller from china and Buyer from the u.S. (the award does not indicate 
why chinese law was applied). 
70  Tribunal of International commercial Arbitration at the russian Federation 
chamber of commerce and Industry, 9 June 2004, no 125/2003, available at: http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/040609r1.html, para 3.3: ‘the Tribunal 
calls attention to the fact that, if one of the parties to an agreement is a russian 
company, according to art. 12 of the Vienna convention of 1980, alterations of the 
conditions of the agreement […] is admissible only in written form and cannot be 
proved solely by the testimony of witnesses. This provision of the Vienna convention 
of 1980 takes into consideration peremptory norms of russian civil legislation (art. 
162 of russian civil code), according to which non-observance of simple written 
form of an external economic agreement entails its nullity’; Tribunal of International 
commercial Arbitration at the russian Federation chamber of commerce and Indus-
try, 16 February 2004, no 107/2002, available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/
wais/db/cases2/040216r1.html, para 3.4.1. (But note that, in both awards, the tribunal 
also declared Russian law to be applicable according to conflict of laws rules.) 
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chinese respectively russian law to cISG contracts. It has furthermore been 
confirmed by a Russian court decision.71 
The correct view, however, seems to be that the Article 96 cISG reser-
vation merely excludes the ipso iure applicability of Article 11 cSG (and 
other provisions of the convention affecting formal requirements), but says 
nothing about the question which law will govern the formal validity of the 
parties’ declarations: This matter is rather left for the private international 
law rules of the forum to determine.72 only this interpretation is in accord-
ance with both the wording of Articles 12, 96 cISG (which provide that the 
cISG’s freedom of form provisions do ‘not apply’, rather than entitling a res-
ervation State to declare that his own form requirements do apply) and with 
the convention’s drafting history, during which the contrary construction 
was discussed, but explicitly rejected.73 courts from Austria, Belgium, Hun-
gary, the netherlands and the russian Federation (among them two Supreme 
courts) have taken the approach advocated here.74 In practical terms, this 
means that the principle of freedom of form may still apply in accordance 
with Article 11 CISG if the applicable conflict of law rules point to the law of 
a cISG contracting State which has not made a reservation under Article 96 
cISG.75 Only if the forum’s conflict of laws rules call for the application of 
71  Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration court of the russian Federation, 25 
March 1997, resolution no 4670/96, available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/970325r1.html: ‘Article 12 establishes that a contract of sale shall be made or 
modified in writing.’
72  district court rotterdam (netherlands), 12 July 2001 (Hispafruit BV v. Amuyen 
S.A.), available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/010712n1.html; 
Lookofsky ‘The 1980 united nations convention’ supra fn 23 at para 332; Schlech-
triem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary supra fn 17 at Art 96 para 3.
73  See rajski in Bianca & Bonell Commentary supra fn 31 at Art 96 para 1.2; Sch-
lechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary supra fn 17 at Art 96 para 3.
74  See the following two footnotes.
75  Supreme court (netherlands), 7 november 1997 (J.T. Schuermans v. Boomsma 
Distilleerderij/Wijnkoperij), Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht (1998) no 91, 
available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/971107n1.html: Ar-
ticle 11 CISG was first declared inapplicable to a Russian-Dutch contract because of 
the russian reservation under Article 96 cISG, but was then applied as part of dutch 
law which, being the law at the seller’s place of business, was deemed applicable by 
virtue of the dutch private international law rules; Supreme court (Austria), 22 octo-
ber 2001, available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/011022a3.
html: despite Hungary’s declaration under Art. 96 cISG, a merely implicitly con-
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a reservation State’s law, will the formal requirements of that law come into 
play (and possibly result in the invalidity of oral communications made by 
the parties).76
Effect as to Addressee: Which Countries’ Courts have to Observe the Res-
ervation?
aRTIcles 92, 93, 94 cIsg
The drafters of Articles 92 and 93 cISG described the effect of these reser-
vations comparatively clearly by stipulating that a reserving State ‘is not to 
be considered a contracting State’ (Article 92(2) cISG) resp. that a party’s 
place of business ‘is considered not to be in a contracting State, unless it is 
in a territorial unit to which the convention extends’ (Article 93(3) cISG): 
The general language used makes clear that this effect has to be observed 
by courts in any State (and not only reserving States), thus creating an erga 
omnes effect.77 In this author’s opinion, the same must hold true for reserva-
tions under Article 94 cISG, their effect being that the convention ‘is not to 
cluded Austrian-Hungarian contract was held formally valid as the Austrian conflict 
of law rules pointed to Austrian law; district court rotterdam (netherlands), 12 July 
2001 (Hispafruit BV v. Amuyen S.A.) supra fn 72; Metropolitan court (Hungary), 24 
March 1992 (Adamfi Video v. Alkotók Studiósa Kisszövetkezet), available at: http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/920324h1.html: although Hungary has 
declared a reservation under Article 96 cISG, an oral German-Hungarian contract 
was held formally valid as the Hungarian conflict of laws rules pointed to German 
law.
76  Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration court of the russian Federation, 20 March 
2002, resolution no 6134/01, available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/
db/cases2/020320r1.html: russian law applied by virtue of the russian private in-
ternational law rules – oral modification of contract held invalid; Rechtbank van 
Koophandel Hasselt (Belgium), 2 May 1995 (Vital Berry Marketing v. Dira-Frost), 
Rechtskundig Weekblad (1995-96) no 40, available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/
cisg/wais/db/cases2/950502b1.html: chilean law applied by virtue of the Belgian pri-
vate international law rules – oral modification of contract held invalid.
77  u.S. district court [new Jersey], 15 June 2005 (Valero Marketing v. Greeni) 
supra fn 59 (on Finland’s Article 92-reservation); Bridge ‘uniform and Harmonized 
Sales Law’ supra fn 27 at para 16.123; Torsello ‘reservations’ supra fn 21 at 97-98; 
contra de Ly, F (2005) ‘Sources of International Sales Law: An eclectic Model’ (25) 
Journal of Law and Commerce 1 at 9.
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apply’ to contracts of sale or to their formation where the parties have their 
places of business in reserving States (Article 94(1), (2) cISG).78
on a practical level, it is not entirely surprising to see that courts in 
non-reserving States are generally more likely to ignore a reservation’s ef-
fect than courts in reserving States: While no cases have been reported in 
which a court intentionally refused to observe a ‘foreign’ Article 92, 93 or 94 
cISG-reservation, a number of courts have in the past overlooked reserva-
tions made by other contracting States79 (despite the fact that these are listed 
in every list of contracting States). Much seems therefore to depend on how 
well the parties are represented during the court proceedings, as a simple ref-
erence to the fact that a party has its place of business in a reserving State will 
often suffice to bring the reservation’s effect to bear in a foreign court.80
aRTIcle 95 cIsg
The interpretation of Article 95 CISG raises more difficult problems. After 
the final text of the Convention had been adopted, it soon became obvious 
that commentators were divided when it came to the question if an Article 95 
cISG declaration is of any relevance in courts of a non-reserving State. The 
ensuing academic discussion, which continues until today, centers around 
the following question: Which law of sales does the court in a non-Article 95 
cISG-reserving State have to apply to a contract of sale, when at least one of 
the parties to that contract does not have its place of business in a contract-
ing State (meaning that Article 1(1)(a) cISG cannot apply) and the forum’s 
private international law rules (which the court then has to resort to under Ar-
78  Brunner UN-Kaufrecht supra fn 18 at Art 94 para 4; Magnus Kommentar supra 
fn 40 at Art 94 para 7; Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary supra 
fn 17 at Art 94 para 9; for the opposing view see de Ly ‘Sources’ supra fn 77 at 10; 
Ferrari, F in Schlechtriem, P and Schwenzer, I (eds) (2004) Kommentar zum Ein-
heitlichen UN-Kaufrecht – CISG – (4th ed) c.H. Beck at Art 94 para 3; Herber and 
czerwenka Internationales Kaufrecht supra fn 9 at Art 94 para 8.
79  German courts of Appeals have acted particularly unfortunate in this respect; see 
oberlandesgericht naumburg, supra fn 51 (denmark’s Article 92 cISG-reservation 
overlooked); oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, supra fn 51 (Sweden’s Article 92 cISG-
reservation overlooked).
80  See Valero Marketing v. Greeni supra fn 59 at 480: ‘As Valero [u.S.] correctly 
notes, the cISG doesn’t govern in this matter with respect to contract formation…’ 
(on Finland’s Article 92-reservation).
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ticle 1(1)(b) cISG) point to the law of an Article 95 cISG-reserving State? A 
significant number of authors believe that the reference of its conflict rules to 
the law of a reserving State should lead the court to apply the same sales law 
as the courts in the reserving State would, ie not the cISG.81 The Federal re-
public of Germany has supported this approach by way of an interpretative 
declaration (to be discussed in more detail below).82 In doing so, this school 
of thought declares the Article 95 cISG reservation of a contracting State to 
be, at least to a certain extent, binding on other contracting States. 
It is submitted that this interpretation of Article 95 cISG is at odds both 
with the wording of the provision and with a systematic comparison with Ar-
ticles 92-94 cISG: By allowing each contracting State to declare that it will 
not be bound by Article 1(1)(b) CISG, Article 95 CISG clearly specifies that 
other contracting States will continue to be bound by Article 1(1)(b) cISG 
even when the sales contract at hand involves a party from a reserving State. 
In striking contrast to Articles 92(2), 93(3) and 94(2) cISG, there is nothing 
in Article 95 cISG to indicate that the reservation does have any effect on 
the reserving State’s status as a contracting State under Article 1(1) cISG.83 
81  Bell ‘Why Singapore should withdraw‘ supra fn 65 at 64; evans in Bianca & 
Bonell Commentary supra fn 31 at Art 95 para 3.4; Kritzer, AH (1989) Guide to 
Practical Applications of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods Kluwer at 78; Magnus Kommentar supra fn 40 at Art 95 para 
6; Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary supra fn 17 at Art 95 
para 4: ‘normally not the cISG’; Schlechtriem, P (2005) ‘requirements of Applica-
tion and Sphere of Applicability of the cISG’ (36) Victoria University of Wellington 
Law Review 781 at 784; Ziegel, J (2005) ‘The Scope of the convention: reaching out 
to Article one and Beyond’ (25) Journal of Law and Commerce 59 at 66.
82  It is interesting to note that in the only German court decision in which such a 
situation has ever arisen, the oberlandesgericht düsseldorf (Germany), 2 June 1993, 
Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (1993), 845, available at: http://cisgw3.law.
pace.edu/cases/930702g1.html adopted the opposite approach: The case involved a 
contract between a seller from Indiana (uSA) and a buyer from Germany, with the 
contract having been concluded at a time when Germany had not yet ratified the 
cISG (which meant that, according to Article 100 cISG, the convention could not 
be applied by virtue of Article 1(1)(a) cISG). The court of Appeals instead looked to 
Article 1(1)(b) cISG, ruled that the German rules of private international law lead to 
the application of the law at the seller’s place of business (ie Indiana) and held that 
the cISG applied.
83  For an author contrasting the wording of Articles 92 and 95 cISG, see Bell ‘Why 
Singapore should withdraw‘ supra fn 65 at 63-64.
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Article 1(1)(b) cISG, furthermore, explicitly instructs each court that ‘This 
Convention applies […] when the rules of private international law lead to 
the application of the law of a contracting State’,84 and not that the law of 
that contracting State is to be applied. In conclusion, an Article 95 cISG 
declaration does neither have an ‘erga omnes’ effect, nor is it to be taken into 
account by courts in other States when applying Article 1(1)(b) CISG – the 
relevance of the Article 95 cISG reservation is, in sum, limited exclusively 
to the reserving State.85
aRTIcle 96 cIsg
As the wording of Articles 12, 96 cISG (‘any provision […] does not apply’) 
makes clear, a reservation declared in accordance with these provisions must 
not only be observed by the courts in the reserving State, but also by courts 
in other States which themselves might not have declared a similar reserva-
tion.86 Case law has confirmed this view.87
84  emphasis added.
85  oberlandesgericht düsseldorf (Germany), 2 June 1993, supra fn 82; Bridge The 
International Sale of Goods supra fn 26 at para 2.44; enderlein and Maskow Interna-
tional Sales Law supra fn 9 at Art 95 no 1; Ferrari in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Kom-
mentar supra fn 78 at Art 1 para 78; Ferrari ‘Short notes’ supra fn 64 at 251; Lando, 
o (1987) ‘The 1985 Hague convention on the Law Applicable to Sales’ (51) Rabels 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 60 at 82; Torsello ‘res-
ervations’ supra fn 21 at 108-109.
86  Flechtner ‘The Several Texts of the cISG’ supra fn 18 at 197; but see Basedow 
‘uniform Private Law conventions’ supra fn 66 at 740-741; Bridge ‘uniform and 
Harmonized Sales Law’ supra fn 27 at para 16.140; Torsello ‘reservations’ supra fn 
21 at 105.
87  Supreme court (netherlands), 7 november 1997, supra fn 75: russian Arti-
cle 96-reservation observed by dutch court; district court rotterdam (netherlands), 
12 July 2001 (Hispafruit BV v. Amuyen S.A.), supra fn 72: Argentinian Article 96-res-
ervation observed by dutch court; coMProMeX (Mexico), 29 April 1996, 17 
Journal of Law and Commerce (1998) 427, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/
db/cases2/960429m1.html: Argentinian Article 96-reservation observed by Mexican 
government commission; rechtbank van Koophandel Hasselt (Belgium), 2 May 
1995, supra fn 76: chilean Article 96-reservation observed by Belgian court.
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Temporal Scope of Effect: When does the Reservation’s Effect Commence 
and Lapse?
Generally speaking, a reservation under the convention takes effect either 
simultaneously with the entry into force of the convention for the reserving 
State or, if the reservation is only declared at a later stage (as possible under 
the ‘at any time’ wording of Articles 94 and 96 CISG), on the first day of 
the month following the expiration of six months after the date of its receipt 
by the depositary (Article 97(3) sentences 1 and 2 cISG). The reservation 
then remains effective until it is withdrawn in accordance with Article 97(4) 
cISG.88
A more complicated regime applies to reservations made in accordance 
with Article 94 cISG, as this reservation needs to be declared with respect 
to one or more other States with whom the reserving State shares ‘closely 
related legal rules’. When both States are contracting States, the necessary 
declarations must be either ‘jointly’ or ‘reciprocal’ (Article 94(1) cISG);89 if 
only one of the States concerned has ratified the CISG, a declaration by the 
Contracting State suffices (Article 94(2) CISG). The need for a concertated 
action that is inherent in Article 94 cISG may result in an unexpected lapse 
of a reservation’s effect, as the example of Iceland demonstrates: When it had 
not yet ratified the CISG, Iceland had been the subject of Article 94(2)-reser-
vations by denmark, Finland, norway or Sweden, with whom Iceland shares 
a closely related sales law. upon its accession to the convention,90 Iceland 
failed to make any declarations in accordance with Article 94(3) cISG (a 
requirement that probably had been overlooked by the responsible officials), 
which caused the existing reservations to lose effect and the Convention to – 
surprisingly – apply between Iceland and its Scandinavian neighbour States 
from 1 June 2002 onwards. only after Iceland had on 12 March 2003 effect-
88  Since the convention entered into force, canada withdrew its Article 95-reserva-
tion (with respect to the canadian province of British columbia) in 1992, and estonia 
its Article 96-reservation in 2004. 
89  Article 97(3) sentence 3 CISG specifically regulates when ‘reciprocal’ declara-
tions take effect.
90  Iceland acceded to the cISG on 10 May 2001, and the convention took effect for 
Iceland on 1 June 2002 in accordance with Article 99(2) cISG.
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ed a notification pursuant to Article 94(1) CISG,91 the Iceland-Scandinavian 
trade was again exempt from the territorial scope of the convention.
Finally, the temporal scope of a reservation’s effect may also be affected 
in cases involving a succession of States. related questions will be discussed 
below in the section dealing with the succession of States and territories.92
Unclear Reservations (and How to Avoid Them) 
even when properly construed, any reservation to a uniform law convention 
by definition reduces the degree of uniformity achieved and may render the 
convention’s practical application more difficult. Article 98 CISG implic-
itly acknowledges this fact by providing that ‘no reservations are permitted 
except those expressly authorized in this convention’, thereby limiting the 
States’ general ‘freedom of contract’ under public international law93 and, at 
the same time, trying to reduce the number and content of reservations that 
courts and arbitrators may have to deal with.
A particular difficulty (and one not directly addressed by Article 98 
cISG) arises when a contracting State makes an unclear reservation. 
The Armenian Declaration
The convention’s more recent history provides the following example. When 
depositing its instrument of accession to the cISG with the Secretary-Gener-
al of the United Nations (Article 91(4) CISG) in 2006, Armenia initially filed 
the following declaration:
‘Pursuant to Article 94, paragraph 1 and 2 of the convention on 
contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the republic of Ar-
menia declares that the convention shall not apply to contracts of 
91  Pursuant to Article 97(3) sentence 3 cISG, this declaration took effect on 1 oc-
tober 2003. 
92  See infra p 463.
93  Treaty clauses introducing limitations of this sort are acknowledged by Arti-
cle 19(b) Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties.
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sale where the parties have their places of business in the republic 
of Armenia.’
What seems clear from the wording of the declaration is that the repub-
lic of Armenia attempted to formulate a ‘reservation’ in the sense defined by 
Article 2(1)(d) Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties, ie a ‘unilateral 
statement […] made by a State […] whereby it purports to exclude or to 
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application 
to that State’. Beyond this, Armenia’s declaration neither conformed to the 
wording of Article 94 (1), (2) cISG nor the general spirit of a reservation 
allowed under this provision, and its possible meaning remains uncertain. In 
this particular case, the declaration’s lack of clarity remained without practi-
cal consequences, as the republic of Armenia apparently withdrew its decla-
ration of accession before the cISG could enter into force for Armenia.94
The risk of making unclear reservations is, however, general in nature, 
as demonstrated by the fact that the People’s republic of china also made a 
reservation under the cISG which lacks clarity:95 Although the wording of 
china’s declaration resembles an Article 96 cISG reservation, its language 
is not as encompassing because it only refers to Article 11 cISG, but neither 
mentions Article 29 cISG nor Part II of the convention.96
94  According to Article 2(1)(g) Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties, a ‘party’ 
to a treaty is a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the 
treaty is in force – at that point, and only at that point, is the State bound by the treaty 
(Aust Modern Treaty Law supra fn 19 at p 75). commentators convincingly argue 
that there is no reason why a withdrawal of an instrument of accession which has 
been deposited with the depositary of a multilateral treaty cannot be done, provided 
that the withdrawal occurs before the instrument takes effect (see id at p 95-96). Ac-
cording to Article 99(2) cISG, the convention only enters into force in respect of an 
acceding State on the first day of the month following the expiration of twelve months 
after the date of the deposit of its instrument of accession – thus, the withdrawal by 
Armenia seems to have been effectuated in a timely manner. At the time of writing, 
the republic of Armenia is not listed as a contracting State to the cISG.
95  declaration made by the People’s republic of china upon approval of the con-
vention on 11 december 1986.
96  The declaration’s wording is (partially) reproduced infra in the next paragraph.
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How to Avoid Unclear Reservations
Against this background, it constitutes a desirable goal to develop procedures 
designed to avoid potential unclarities. As a starting point, two steps come 
to mind: First, is seems advisable for the States to keep the content of their 
reservations to the necessary minimum, and to refrain from repeating the text 
of reservation provisions from which, according to Article 98 cISG, they are 
not free to derogate. A reservation reading ‘State X makes a declaration in 
accordance with Article 96’ is thus preferable to ‘State X does not consider 
itself to be bound by Article 11 as well as the provisions in the convention 
relating to the content of Article 11’:97 numbers are, in short, preferable to 
words. As a second measure, uncITrAL (or a similar institution) could 
make model reservations available to the contracting States, enabling them 
to use model wordings developed by experts when formulating a reservation 
under a uniform law convention.
Interpretation of Unclear Reservations by the Courts
In cases in which an unclear reservation has been made, it will be up to the 
courts and arbitrators to interpret the respective reservation in order to de-
termine its effect upon the convention’s application to the case at hand. In 
doing so, it is submitted that Article 31(1) Vienna convention on the Law 
of Treaties in conjunction with Article 98 cISG provide an important inter-
pretative guideline: When read together, these two treaty provisions indicate 
that all reservations should be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms used therein and thus, in the 
light of the object and purpose of Article 98 cISG, should be construed as 
invoking Articles 92-96 cISG (only) in accordance with the respective reser-
vation’s prerequisites and effect as laid down in these Final Provisions. 
In accordance with this interpretative guideline, the People’s republic 
of china’s declaration pertaining to form requirements should be read as not 
only covering Article 11 cISG, but also the convention’s other provisions 
allowing for an oral or implicit conclusion, modification or termination of 
97  cf the declaration by the People’s republic of china referred to supra.
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cISG contracts, as this reading conforms to the reservation’s effect as laid 
down in Article 96 cISG.98
‘InTerPreTATIVe decLArATIonS’
occasionally, contracting States attach to their instruments of accession 
statements which, on their face, do not purport to ‘exclude or modify the le-
gal effect’ of the cISG for the State making them (and are therefore not to be 
regarded as ‘reservations’ in the sense used by Articles 2(1)(d), 19-21 Vienna 
convention on the Law of Treaties), but rather seek to provide an interpreta-
tion of certain provisions of the convention. declarations of this sort, which 
are commonly referred to as ‘interpretative declarations’,99 pose particular 
problems when made under a uniform law convention like the cISG.
Examples of Declarations ‘Interpreting’ the CISG
The Hungarian Declaration on Article 90 CISG
When Hungary on 16 June 1983 deposited its instrument of ratification with 
the depository of the CISG, being among the first States to do so, the instru-
ment contained the following declaration:
‘[The Hungarian People’s republic] considers the General condi-
tions of delivery of Goods between organizations of the Member 
countries of the council for Mutual economic Assistance/Gcd 
cMeA, 1968/1975, version of 1979/ to be subject to the provisions 
of article 90 of the convention’.
one can only speculate what prompted the Hungarian Government 
to make this explanatory statement addressing the (today largely obscure) 
‘Gcd cMeA’, a comprehensive set of rules governing the intra-coMecon 
98  See also Wang and Andersen ‘The chinese declaration’ supra fn 46 at 146: ‘This 
difference in declaration language would seem to be without significance regarding 
the effect of the declaration’; but see Bailey ‘Facing the Truth’ supra fn 25 at 312.
99  Mcrae, dM (1978) ‘The Legal effect of Interpretative declarations’ (49) British 
Yearbook of International Law 155.
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trade that Article 90 CISG had specifically been drafted to cover.100 A pos-
sible reason might have been that Professor Gyula eörsi, who had acted as a 
member of the Hungarian delegation to the Vienna diplomatic conference 
and, enjoying an excellent reputation and high respect within the interna-
tional academic community, had also served as the President of the confer-
ence, had written in a 1983 article that ‘the trade law among coMecon 
countries inter se is unified and will remain unaffected by virtue of Art. 94 of 
the convention’.101 This may have alerted Hungarian officials to the fact that 
the most prominent Hungarian expert on the cISG apparently did not concur 
with the view that saw the Gdc cMeA covered by Article 90 cISG.
The interpretation of Article 90 cISG favoured by Hungary in its inter-
pretative declaration turned out to be in conformity with the view adopted 
by the majority of international commentators102 and by a number of arbitral 
tribunals, which considered the (closely related) General Principles of de-
liveries between the Soviet union and the Peoples’ republic of china to be 
subject to Article 90 cISG.103 As far as can be ascertained, no Hungarian 
court ever addressed the applicability of Article 90 cISG to the Gdc cMeA, 
nor is there any indication that courts in other countries have taken note of 
Hungary’s interpretative declaration.
100  See Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 
8 at § 9 paras 12 et seq (with extensive references to Article 90 cISG’s legislative 
history).
101  eörsi, G (1983) ‘A Propos the 1980 Vienna convention on contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods’ (31) American Journal of Comparative Law 333 at 342.
102  See enderlein and Maskow International Sales Law supra fn 9 at Art 90 no 2; 
Heuzé, V (2000) La vente internationale de marchandises: Droit uniforme L.G.D.J. 
no 112; Kritzer Guide to Practical Applications supra fn 81 at 551; Magnus Kom-
mentar supra fn 40 at Art 90 para 9.
103  Tribunal of International commercial Arbitration at the russian Federation 
chamber of commerce and Industry, 14 April 1998, no. 47/1997, available at: http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/980414r1.html, para 3.1; Tribunal of In-
ternational commercial Arbitration at the russian Federation chamber of commerce 
and Industry, 2 october 1998, no. 113/1997, available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.
edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/981002r1.html, para 3.1; Tribunal of International com-
mercial Arbitration at the russian Federation chamber of commerce and Industry, 
22 March 2002, no. 225/2000, available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/
db/cases2/020322r1.html, paras 1.2, 3.3.
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The German Declaration on Articles 1(1)(b) and 95 CISG
The Federal republic of Germany made the following declaration when ac-
ceding to the convention: 
‘The Government of the Federal republic of Germany holds the 
view that Parties to the convention that have made a declaration 
under article 95 of the convention are not considered contracting 
States within the meaning of subparagraph (b) of article 1 of the 
Convention. Accordingly, there is no obligation to apply – and the 
Federal Republic of Germany assumes no obligation to apply – this 
provision when the rules of private international law lead to the ap-
plication of the law of a Party that has made a declaration to the 
effect that it will not be bound by subparagraph (1) (b) of article 1 of 
the convention. Subject to this observation the Government of the 
Federal republic of Germany makes no declaration under article 95 
of the convention.’
As is clear from its last sentence, the statement cited was neither meant 
to constitute a reservation in accordance with Article 95 cISG nor a ‘partial’ 
reservation,104 but an interpretative declaration.105 In its declaration, the Gov-
ernment of the Federal republic of Germany ‘interpreted’ both Articles 1(1)
(b) and 95 cISG in a particular manner and thus chose to take a position in a 
dispute which – as has been noted above – continues until today. In this con-
text, it is not without interest to remember that the German delegation to the 
Vienna diplomatic conference had vigorously criticized both Articles 1(1)
(b) and 95 cISG, but had eventually failed in its attempts to have the provi-
sions removed from the convention’s text.106 
104  But see reinhart UN-Kaufrecht supra fn 11 at Art 2 VertragsG para 1; Lüderitz, 
A and Fenge, A in Soergel, HT (2000) Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, Vol. 13: Schuldrecht-
liche Nebengesetze – CISG (13th ed) Kohlhammer at Art 1 para 16.
105  Ferrari in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Kommentar supra fn 78 at Art 1 para 79; 
Herber and czerwenka Internationales Kaufrecht supra fn 9 at Art 1 para 19; Magnus 
Kommentar supra fn 40 at Art 1 para 112.
106  See delegate Herber (Federal republic of Germany) in Official Records supra 
fn 36 p 236-237.
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Legal Significance of Interpretative Declarations
The cISG’s Final Provisions do not address interpretative declarations. Their 
legal significance is therefore subject to the applicable standards of public 
international law.107 Although a clear view or practice in this matter has not 
emerged,108 it is beyond dispute that an interpretative declaration may not be 
made where such a declaration is prohibited by the treaty it is relating to. This 
is precisely the situation under the cISG: While interpretative declarations 
are not contrary to Article 98 cISG,109 it is submitted that they are incompat-
ible with Article 7(1) cISG,110 as this provision declares an internationally 
uniform interpretation to be the cISG’s decisive goal and, even more impor-
tant, delegates the task of developing the convention’s interpretation to the 
courts and not the government or parliament of the individual contracting 
States.111 Article 7(1) cISG accordingly prohibits contracting States from 
influencing the Convention’s interpretation through interpretative declara-
tions. Any interpretative declaration that is made nevertheless must therefore 
remain without legal effect.112
one might add that, under public international law, this result is not 
changed by the fact that the un Secretary-General as the depositary of the 
convention (Article 89 cISG) accepted the declarations by Hungary and 
Germany for deposit and communicated their text to all contracting States: 
Article 77 Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties113 makes it clear that 
the depositary’s functions in this respect are limited to receiving those com-
munications and informing other States thereof, without granting the deposi-
107  Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary supra fn 17 at Art 98 
para 2.
108  Mcrae ‘Interpretative declarations’ supra fn 99 at 160.
109  But see Bridge The International Sale of Goods supra fn 26 at para 2.44 fn 
171.
110  Ferrari ‘Short notes’ supra fn 64 at 251; Torsello ‘reservations’ supra fn 21 at 
117 (both on Germany’s interpretative declaration).
111  See Basedow ‘uniform Private Law conventions’ supra fn 66 at 735: ‘With the 
exception of reservations permitted in the convention, the binding treaty only leaves 
national legislators a choice between “yes” and “no”.’
112  See Torsello ‘reservations’ supra fn 21 at 117.
113  Article 77 Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties governs the depositary’s 
functions under the cISG; see Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commen-
tary supra fn 17 at Art 89 para 2.
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tary any power to adjudicate on the declaration’s validity or its legal effect.114 
In addition, the fact that all other contracting States remained silent in the 
face of the Hungarian and the German interpretative declarations is simi-
larly without relevance: Article 20(5) convention on the Law of Treaties is 
inapplicable as it is only concerned with reservations, and there is no duty 
to respond to interpretative declarations under general international law.115 
Inaction can accordingly not be treated as aquiescence, and does not cure the 
declarations’ legal insignificance.
Interpretative Declarations and Interpretative Domestic Legislation
Finally, some contracting States have enacted domestic laws which purport 
to interpret certain provisions of the cISG. Legislation of this kind can eg 
be found in canada,116 Germany117 and norway.118 unlike the ‘interpretative 
declarations’ discussed above, these cases of interpretative domestic legisla-
tion have not been communicated to the depositary of the convention, and 
their content has therefore not even been brought to the other contracting 
States’ attention. According to the applicable rules of public international 
law, interpretative domestic legislation is of no legal significance to other 
contracting States and their courts, which are therefore not only entitled to 
disregard its content, but are even obliged to do so because of their obligation 
to apply the convention’s rules in accordance with Article 7(1) cISG.119 
As Article 7(1) cISG has to be observed by every contracting State, 
those contracting States which have prescribed a certain interpretation by 
way of an interpretative domestic legislation are arguably acting in violation 
of public international law. This is certainly the case if the content of the 
interpretative domestic legislation departs from the prevailing international 
114  Mcrae ‘Interpretative declarations’ supra fn 99 at 171.
115  Mcrae ‘Interpretative declarations’ supra fn 99 at 169.
116  Most canadian provinces have enacted laws interpreting Article 6 cISG; see 
Ziegel, J (1991) ‘canada Prepares to Adopt the International Sales convention’ (18) 
Canadian Business Law Journal 1 at 3.
117  Article 2 of the German Vertragsgesetz, which repeats the content of Germany’s 
‘interpretative declaration’ pertaining to Articles 1(1)(b) and 95 cISG (see above).
118  See Hagstrøm, V (2006) ‘CISG – Implementation in Norway, an approach not 
advisable’ Internationales Handelsrecht 246 at 247-248.
119  See Ziegel ‘canada Prepares to Adopt’ supra fn 116 at 11.
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interpretation of the cISG provisions concerned, given that Article 27 Vi-
enna convention on the Law of Treaties explictly provides that ‘[a] party 
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure 
to perform a treaty’.120 But  Article 7(1) cISG, it is submitted, should be 
read as going even further: Any domestic act which requires courts to fol-
low a national legislator’s view when interpreting the convention should be 
regarded as a violation of the contracting State’s obligations arising from the 
convention, even if the cISG’s interpretation laid down in the interpretative 
domestic legislation should be in accordance with the internationally prevail-
ing view.121
SucceSSIon oF STATeS And THe cISG
The Succession of States122 is a phenomenon that has gained some impor-
tance for the convention’s applicability, in particular through its impact upon 
certain territories’ status as ‘contracting States’ under the cISG. Since the 
CISG’s Final Provisions provide no specific rules addressing these develop-
ments, recourse has to be had to rules of customary public international law. 
The definition of those rules is, however, unfortunately difficult,123 as only 
some of the provisions in the Vienna convention on Succession of States in 
120  This raises the following question: Are the courts in States which have enacted 
an interpretative domestic legislation free to depart from the domestic law in favour 
of an international interpretative approach? The matter has to be decided in accor-
dance with the respective constitutional law, and cannot be discussed here. Suffice it 
to say that at least one commentator has argued that German courts are not bound by 
domestic interpretative law in this situation, but should follow Article 7(1) cISG; see 
Magnus Kommentar supra fn 40 at Art 1 para 111. 
121  Cf Hagstrøm ‘CISG – Implementation in Norway’ supra fn 118 at 247.
122  See Brownlie, I (1998) Principles of Public International Law (5th ed) oxford 
university Press at p 650: ‘It is of great importance to note that the phrase “state suc-
cession” is employed to describe an area, or a source of problems: the term does not 
connote any principle or presumption that a transmission or succession of legal rights 
and duties occurs.’
123  cf Aust Modern Treaty Law supra fn 19 at p 307: ‘It is [...] a particularly uncer-
tain and controversial area of international law’; Brownlie Principles of Public Inter-
national Law supra fn 122 at p 650; Gamarra, Y (2000) ‘current Questions of State 
Succession relating to Multilateral Treaties’ in eisemann, PM and Koskenniemi, M 
(eds) State Succession: Codification Tested against the Facts Martinus nijhoff p 387 
at 388.
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respect of Treaties of 23 August 1978 are regarded as codifying customary 
international law.124
Uniform Law in a World of Shifting Borders
Soon after the cISG had entered into force on 1 January 1988, the world en-
tered a new era that was marked by significant changes on the global political 
landscape: Within a couple of years, a number of States that had participated 
in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference of 1980 and had subsequently ratified 
the Sales convention would cease to exist, new States would be established 
in their place and again others would encounter changes in their borders. 
The first change in the fledgling CISG landscape was caused by the Ger-
man reunification on 3 October 1990, when the German Democratic Repub-
lic (then already a cISG contracting State) acceeded to the Federal republic 
of Germany (at that stage still a non-contracting State).125 In 1991, the union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) – for which the CISG entered into 
force on 1 September that year – began to dissolve, and a significant number 
of independent States emerged, which among them adopted a variety of posi-
tions towards the convention (see below). The Socialist Federal republic of 
Yugoslavia, which had been a cISG contracting State since 1 January 1988, 
similarly underwent significant changes, when from 1991 onwards most of 
its republics declared their independence.
Effective 1 January 1993, another Contracting State – the Czechoslovak 
Socialist republic (cSSr)126 – dissolved and left the Czech Republic and 
the Slovak republic as its successors. on 1 July 1997, the territory of Hong 
124  See Aust Modern Treaty Law supra fn 19 at p 306; Gamarra ‘current Ques-
tions’ supra fn 123 at 434; Williams, Pr (1994) ‘The Treaty obligations of the Suc-
cessor States of the former Soviet union, Yugoslavia and czechoslovakia: do They 
continue in Force?’ (23) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 1 at 8. 
The practice of the Secretary-General of the united nations, however, is based on 
the assumption that the Vienna Convention essentially codifies customary interna-
tional law; cf Zimmermann, A (2000) Staatennachfolge in völkerrechtliche Verträge 
Springer at p 755-757.
125  The cISG entered into force for the Federal republic of Germany on 1 January 
1991.
126  The cISG had entered into force for the cSSr on 1 April 1991.
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Kong – which since 1842 had been a British crown colony, and therefore part 
of a Non-Contracting State – was restored to the People’s Republic of China 
(a cISG contracting State), and on 20 december 1999 a similar develop-
ment finally took place with respect to Macao, which for centuries had been 
administered by Portugal (another non-contracting State).127
Effect of State successions upon the Status as a CISG ‘Contracting 
State’
In determining the legal effect that a State succession (as the ones described 
above) may have upon the affected territories’ status as a cISG ‘contracting 
State’, a number of different scenarios need to be distinguished:
Dissolution and Separation of States
When a part or parts of the territory of a contracting State for which the 
cISG is in force separate to form one or more States (as in case of the uSSr, 
the former Yugoslavia and the cSSr), two possible, but mutually exclusive 
principles may apply: According to the ‘continuity principle’, the conven-
tion would automatically continue in force in respect of each successor State 
so formed. Articles 34(1)(a), 35 Vienna convention on Succession of States 
in respect of Treaties are based on the assumption that this ‘continuity princi-
ple’ constitutes the general rule. According to the ‘clean-slate principle’, on 
the contrary, the Convention ratified by the predecessor State would only be-
come binding upon the successor State once the latter has filed a formal no-
tification of succession. Although this approach has been codified in Articles 
17-23 Vienna convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties for 
‘newly independent States’ (ie former colonies and dependent territories128) 
only, it is widely assumed that the ‘clean-slate principle’ also applies to cer-
tain other cases,129 in particular to States which came into existence through 
127  See Schroeter ‘The Status of Hong Kong and Macao’ supra fn 15 at 312.
128  See the definition of ‘newly independent States’ in Article 2(1)(f) Vienna Con-
vention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties.
129  Brownlie Principles of Public International Law supra fn 122 at p 663-664; 
Gamarra ‘current Questions’ supra fn 123 at 393; Zimmermann Staatennachfolge 
supra fn 124 at p 826.
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separation from a predecessor State which continues to exist (‘separation’ or 
‘cession’ as opposed to complete ‘dismembration’ or ‘dissolution’).130 When 
applied to rights and obligations arising from the cISG, the principles just 
mentioned lead to the following results:
No practical difficulties arise whenever a successor State’s status as a 
Contracting State is being supported through a notification of succession 
which the successor State files with the treaty’s depositary. With respect to 
the cISG, this step was taken by the russian Federation (successor to the 
uSSr, and continuing its international legal personality), Belarus (successor 
to the Byelorussian SSr), the ukraine (successor to the ukrainian SSr), the 
czech republic and the Slovak republic (successors to the cSSr), Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia (adopting the name 
‘The former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia’) (successors to the Socialist 
Federal republic of Yugoslavia, the so-called ‘former Yugoslavia’), as well 
as the republic of Serbia and the republic of Montenegro (successors to 
Serbia and Montenegro, a State which – under the then name of ‘Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia’ – had also been a successor to the ‘former Yugo-
slavia’131). While the legal certainty created by the notification procedure is 
only too welcome, it is worth remembering that, from a dogmatic point of 
view, the contracting State status of the above mentioned States arguably 
arose ipso iure because of the ‘continuity principle’: Their notifications of 
succession were therefore purely declaratory in nature,132 merely confirming 
a situation which, by international law, already existed.133 
130  Shaw, Mn (2003) International Law (5th ed) cambridge university Press at p 
879; Zimmermann Staatennachfolge supra fn 124 at p 826; but see Brownlie Princi-
ples of Public International Law supra fn 122 at p 663 who even states that the ‘clean 
slate principle’ constitutes the general rule.
131  The Federal republic of Yugoslavia had been created in 1992 and claimed to 
continue the international legal personality of the former Yugoslavia, to which the 
former republics now independent – see above – objected.
132  note that, according to Article 9 Vienna convention on Succession of States in 
respect of Treaties, a unilateral notification of succession by a successor State alone 
does not suffice in order to transfer the rights and duties under a treaty.
133  A difference between a notification of succession establishing the Contracting 
State status and a notification (unnecessarily) conforming it would only arise as far 
as the period between the date of succession and the notification of succession is 
concerned: However, this difference is being removed whenever a notification of 
succession declares the convention retroactively applicable.
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Another group of successor States refrained from filing a notice of suc-
cession, and instead selected to ratify the cISG themselves. This approach 
was adopted by a significant number of States whose territories previously 
formed part of the uSSr, namely estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova and uzbekistan.134 It is in accordance with what seems 
to be the prevailing view with respect to the legal situation of the former So-
viet republics, which – apart from the Russian Federation, which continued 
the uSSr (Article 35 Vienna convention on Succession of States in respect 
of Treaties) – are considered to have inhereted a ‘clean slate’.135 Their posi-
tion as a cISG contracting State was therefore established by acceding to the 
convention de novo in their own name.
Finally, a number of States whose territory previously formed part of the 
USSR – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tjikistan and Turkmenistan136 – 
neither deposited an instrument of accession with the depositary of the cISG 
in accordance with Article 91(3), (4) CISG, nor made a notification of suc-
cession establishing their succession to the uSSr’s rights and obligations 
arising from the CISG. These former Soviet republics – who, in short, sim-
ply remained silent – can therefore currently not be considered ‘Contracting 
States’ under the cISG, as the ‘clean slate principle’ governing their position 
removed the legal nexus between the convention and their respective ter-
ritories.137
Territory of a State Becoming Part of Another State
A somewhat different development takes place when a certain territory 
(within which sellers or buyers may reside) and which, under public inter-
134  As mentioned above, Armenia also filed an instrument of accession in 2006, but 
apparently withdrew it.
135  Brownlie Principles of Public International Law supra fn 122 at p 664; Gama-
rra ‘current Questions’ supra fn 123 at 419; Korman, ST (1992) ‘The 1978 Vienna 
convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties: An Inadequate response 
to Issues of State Succession’ (16) Suffolk Transnational Law Review 174 at 188-189 
(on the Baltic States).
136  For background information on these countries’ position towards the cISG, see 
Knieper, r (2005) ‘celebrating Success by Accession to cISG’ (25) Journal of Law 
and Commerce 477, at 479-480.
137  See supra fn 135.
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national law, is (part of) one State, now becomes part of another (already 
existing) State. A change of this kind can affect the applicability of the cISG 
in two different constellations, both of which have already occurred in the 
history of the convention:
The first development to be considered involves a Contracting State (or 
part thereof) becoming part of a non-contracting State. This happened when 
the German democratic republic, which had been a cISG contracting State 
since 1 March 1990, effective 3 october 1990 acceded to the Federal re-
public of Germany (at that time still a non-contracting State, as the con-
vention only entered into force for the Federal republic of Germany on 1 
January 1991). Generally speaking, upon becoming part of the territory of 
another State, treaties of the predecessor State cease to be in force in re-
spect of the territory to which the succession of States relates, as provided 
by Article 15(a) Vienna convention on Succession of States in respect of 
Treaties. As the German reunification was marked by a number of unique 
circumstances,138 commentators are divided if this solution also applies to 
eastern Germany’s status under the cISG between 3 october 1990 and 1 
January 1991.139 Suffice it to say that the point has not gained any practical 
relevance, as no international sales contract concluded by an eastern German 
party during this brief period has been reported that would have raised the 
question of the convention’s applicability.
The reverse situation occured when on 1 July 1997 the territory of Hong 
Kong – which was at that point a British crown colony, and therefore part 
of a CISG non-Contracting State – was restored to the People’s Republic of 
china (a cISG contracting State), and when on 20 december 1999 a simi-
lar development took place with respect to Macao, which for centuries had 
been administered by Portugal (another non-contracting State). As I have 
argued in more detail elsewhere,140 the transfer of Hong Kong and Macao 
to the People’s republic of china resulted in those two territories becom-
138  See Gamarra ‘current Questions’ supra fn 123 at 402 et seq.
139  See Magnus Kommentar supra fn 40 at einl zum cISG paras 15-17 (listing 
numerous references).
140  Schroeter ‘The Status of Hong Kong and Macao’ supra fn 15 at 320-326; 
Schroeter, uG (2004) ‘die Vertragsstaateneigenschaft Hongkongs und Macaus unter 
dem un-Kaufrecht’ Internationales Handelsrecht 7.
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ing part of a contracting State from the date of the respective ‘handover’,141 
an assessment which is in conformity with the ‘moving-boundary principle’ 
recognized as customary international law142 as well as the fact that china 
has not made a declaration under Article 93 cISG, by way of which it could 
have easily exempted its new ‘Special Administrative regions’ from the ter-
ritorial scope of the convention. courts143 as well as commentators144 have 
since adopted the position advocated here.
Successions and Reservations
neither the Final Provisions of the cISG nor the Vienna convention on Suc-
cession of States in respect of Treaties contain a specific provision which 
governs the legal destiny of reservations declared by a predecessor State. 
under the cISG, this question has arisen with respect to the cSSr’s reserva-
tion under Article 95 CISG, which was neither confirmed nor withdrawn in 
the notifications of succession filed by the Czech Republic and the Slovak 
republic.145 Article 20(1) Vienna convention on Succession of States in re-
spect of Treaties (the scope of which is limited to newly independent States) 
141  For Hong Kong: 1 July 1997; for Macao: 20 december 1999.
142  cf Aust Modern Treaty Law supra fn 19 at p 307.
143  oberlandesgericht Hamm (Germany), 12 november 2001, OLG-Report Hamm 
(2002), 185, available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011112g1.html: con-
vention applied to contract between a German buyer and a seller from Hong Kong 
according to Article 1(1)(a) cISG, as ‘[b]oth Germany and china are contracting 
States to the cISG [and] the parties have their places of business in the States men-
tioned above’; rechtbank van Koophandel Turnhout (Belgium), 18 January 2001 
(Index Syndicate Ltd. v. NV Carta Mundi), available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/010118b1.html: ‘both Belgium and the People’s republic of china, of which 
Hong Kong again forms part, have ratified the Convention.’
144  Magnus Kommentar supra fn 40 at p 30; Mcnamara, T (2003) ‘u.n. Sale of 
Goods convention: Finally coming of Age?’ (32) Colorado Lawyer 11 at 13; Posch, 
W in Schwimann, M (ed) (2006) ABGB Praxiskommentar, Vol 4 (3rd ed) Lexisnexis 
at Art 93 para 4; Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary supra fn 
17 at Art 1 para 9; Shen, J (1998) ‘cross-Strait Trade and Investment and the role of 
Hong Kong’ (16) Wisconsin International Law Journal 661 at 668; but see Busch-
baum, M (2004) ‘Anwendbarkeit des un-Kaufrechts im Verhältnis zu Hongkong’ 
Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 546.
145  cf de Ly ‘Sources’ supra fn 77 at 10: ‘There is some doubt whether the czecho-
slovakian reservation survived that country’s split.’
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provides that the successor State shall be considered as maintaining any res-
ervation which was applicable at the date of the succession of States, unless 
it expressly states otherwise. Although Articles 30-38 Vienna convention 
lack a similar provision, it is submitted that the same must apply to other 
cases of State succession, as the ‘continuity principle’ is based on the very 
idea that the predecessor’s scope of treaty obligations survives the succes-
sion unchanged.146 As a result, the reservation according to Article 95 cISG 
is still effective for the czech and the Slovac republic.147
THe conVenTIon’S reLATIonSHIP WITH oTHer  
InTernATIonAL InSTruMenTS: ArTIcLeS 90, 94 cISG  
And euroPeAn coMMunITY LAW
A most difficult question relating to the position of the CISG within the in-
ternational legal order is raised by the developing ‘regionalisation’ of inter-
national business law:148 Which rules should govern the relationship between 
the convention on one hand and instruments adopted by regional communi-
ties of States on the other hand in case these instruments apply to interna-
tional contracts subject to the cISG, but provide for solutions that differ 
from those used in the Convention? Such a ‘conflict of norms’ between two 
international instruments is currently most likely to occur between the cISG 
and instruments adopted by the european community, as the vast majority 
of its Member States have also ratified the CISG. The European Community 
legislation in force already contains a number of provisions not in harmony 
with the convention, amongst others in the consumer Sales directive,149 
146  Zimmermann Staatennachfolge supra fn 124 at p 755-757. But see Brownlie 
Principles of Public International Law supra fn 122 at p 668, who characterizes the 
issue as ‘yet unsettled’.
147  Magnus Kommentar supra fn 40 at Art 95 para 4; Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem 
& Schwenzer Commentary supra fn 17 at Art 1 para 41; but see enderlein, F (1997) 
‘Vienna convention and eastern european Lawyers’ IBA International Sales Quar-
terly 12.
148  de Ly ‘Sources’ supra fn 77 at 3; see Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches 
Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at §§ 6-15.
149  directive 1999/44/ec of the european Parliament and of the council of 25 May 
1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees; 
see Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 6 
paras 188-290, § 15 paras 89-120.
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the distance Selling directive,150 the directive on Late Payments151 and the 
Brussels regulation.152 In the future, comparable conflicts also seem possible 
between the convention and Actes Uniformes adopted by the organisation 
for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (better known under its 
French acronym ‘oHAdA’)153 or Decisiones adopted by the Mercado co-
mun del Sur (MercoSur).154
The cISG’s Part IV contains two provisions designed to govern the 
convention’s relationship with concurrent international instruments (‘Rela-
tionsnormen’155), namely Article 90 cISG and Article 94 cISG. They differ 
both in their scope of application and in their legal effect: While Article 90 
cISG merely applies to ‘international agreements’ concluded by contracting 
States, but accords prevalence to any of those agreements without requiring 
any specific action by a State involved, Article 94 CISG accommodates any 
instrument that introduces the same or closely related legal rules into the 
participating States’ legal systems, but does require explicit declarations of 
150  directive 97/7/ec of the european Parliament and of the council of 20 May 
1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts; see Schroeter 
UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 6 paras 126-187, 
§ 15 paras 76-88.
151  directive 2000/35/ec of the european Parliament and of the council of 29 
June 2000 on combating late payment in commercial transactions; see Schroeter UN-
Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 6 paras 337-399, 
§ 15 paras 121-166.
152  council regulation (ec) no 44/2001 of 22 december 2000 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters; see 
Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 6 pa-
ras 16-34, § 15 paras 7-23.
153  While the Acte uniforme sur le droit commercial général the oHAdA adopted 
on 17 April 1997 is largely based on the cISG, it does contain a number of poten-
tially conflicting provisions; see Schroeter, UG (2001) ‘Das einheitliche Kaufrecht 
der oHAdA-Staaten’ Law in Africa 163 at 167. That a conflict with the CISG must 
currently seem unlikely is due to the fact that among the oHAdA States only Gabon 
and Guinea have adopted the convention.
154  On conflicts between such acts and international conventions in general see 
Basedow, J (2003) ‘Worldwide Harmonisation of Private Law and regional eco-
nomic Integration – General Report’ Uniform Law Review 31 at 38; specifically on 
conflicts with the CISG see Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemein-
schaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 9 para 41.
155  on this German legal term, see Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Ge-
meinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 7 paras 27-30.
Sharing International Commercial Law across National Boundaries466
non-application to be made to the depositary in order discard the cISG’s ap-
plicability in favor of these unified or harmonised legal rules.
Although the applicability of Articles 90 and 94 cISG to secondary eu-
ropean community law is still hotly disputed, it is submitted that Article 90 
cISG can neither be applied to ec regulations nor ec directives,156 as these 
acts do not qualify as ‘international agreements’ and have – maybe more 
importantly – not been entered into by Contracting States to the CISG (as re-
quired by Article 90 cISG), but rather enacted by the european community, 
a legal entity not party to the convention.157 Secondary european commu-
nity law could therefore only displace the cISG by way of Article 94 cISG 
(as EC regulations introduce the ‘same’ and EC directives – at least in most 
cases – ‘closely related legal rules’),158 but would require the necessary reser-
vations to be expressly declared (Article 97(2) cISG). The latter requirement 
will contribute to legal certainty,159 and may even lead the ec Member States 
to reconsider the desirability of discarding the existing global uniform law in 
favor of a merely regional harmonisation of laws. 
156  Ferrari, F (2003) ‘Universal and Regional Sales Law: Can They Coexist?’ 
Uniform Law Review 177 at 182; Janssen, A (2003) ‘The final seller’s right of redress 
under the consumer Sales directive and its complex relationship with the cISG’ 
European Legal Forum 181 at 183; Magnus Kommentar supra fn 40 at Art 90 paras 
4, 10; Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary supra fn 17 at Art 90 
paras 12-13; Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 
8 at § 9 para 45. contra Herber, r in Schlechtriem, P (ed) (1998) Commentary on the 
UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods oxford university Press at Art 94 
para 3; Herber and czerwenka Internationales Kaufrecht supra fn 9 at Art 90 para 4; 
Siehr, K in Honsell, H (ed) (1997) Kommentar zum UN-Kaufrecht Springer at Art 90 
para 7; Witz in Witz, Salger & Lorenz International Einheitliches Kaufrecht supra fn 
11 at Art 90 para 3.
157  See in more detail Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschafts-
recht supra fn 8 at § 9 paras 33-40.
158  Janssen ‘The final seller’s right of redress’ supra fn 156 at 183-184; Magnus 
Kommentar supra fn 40 at Art 94 para 1; Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches 
Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 10 para 11. contra ernst, B (2002) Das Wie-
ner Übereinkommen von 1980 über Verträge über den internationalen Warenkauf 
(UN-Kaufrecht) im Recht der Produkthaftung Shaker 98; Ferrari in Schlechtriem & 
Schwenzer Kommentar supra fn 78 at Art 94 para 5.
159  Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary supra fn 17 at Art 94 
para 3; but see Torsello ‘reservations’ supra fn 21 at 95 (who reaches the opposite 
conclusion).
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At the time of writing, no declaration under Article 94 cISG in favor of 
european community law has been made, and the prevalence of the conven-
tion accordingly stands.160
FuTure AcceSSIonS: THe LIMITATIon To ‘STATeS’  
(ArTIcLe 91(3) cISG)
When thinking about the future of the convention, one might contemplate a 
future accession not only by other States, but also by regional or international 
organisations. Such a step, which has already been advocated by commenta-
tors with a view to a possible accession of the european community to the 
cISG,161 raises the interesting question if the Final Provisions of the cISG 
allow for the membership of an international entity as the european com-
munity or, for example, the oHAdA. 
The relevant provision is Article 91(3) cISG, which provides that the 
convention ‘is open for accession by all States which are not signatory 
States as from the date it is open for signature’. This so-called ‘all-states 
clause’ is in accordance with Article 6 of the Vienna convention on the Law 
of Treaties, which addresses the related issue of each State’s capacity to con-
clude treaties. At the time of its adoption in 1980, Article 91(3) cISG was 
considered a liberal clause, as comparable provisions in older conventions 
had often stated that only Member States of the un or of one of its special 
agencies could become contracting States,162 thereby excluding accession 
by States that were not internationally recognized and, for that matter, by 
international organizations.
The wording of Article 91(3) cISG as it stands, however, still only pro-
vides for an accession of ‘States’ to the convention. The european com-
160  cf also Article 307(2) ec Treaty.
161  Basedow, J (2003) ‘die europäische Gemeinschaft als Partei von Übereinkom-
men des einheitlichen Privatrechts’ in Schwenzer, I and Hager, G (eds) Festschrift 
für Peter Schlechtriem zum 70. Geburtstag Mohr Siebeck 165; Hartley, T (1979) The 
Law relating to the International Sale of Goods commission of the european com-
munities para 1.30; Schwartze, A (2000) Europäische Sachmängelgewährleistung 
beim Warenkauf Mohr Siebeck 597 (for an accession of the european union). 
162  Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary supra fn 17 at Art 91 
para 2 fn 2.
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munity, on the other hand, clearly does not constitute a State in the sense 
employed by public international law, which, according to some authors, 
suffices to effectively bar an accession of the European Community.163 The 
better reasons, it is submitted, militate in favor of a more flexible interpre-
tation of Article 91(3) cISG, which would also be in accordance with the 
practice that has developed in the application of this treaty provision (cf Ar-
ticle 31(3)(b) Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties): The fact that the 
uSSr became a contracting State at a time when the Byelorussian SSr and 
the Ukrainian SSR – which formed part of the USSR, but had both not been 
recognized as sovereign by most States164 – were already Contracting States 
to the cISG in their own right, aptly demonstrates that political factors have 
always played a significant role within the interpretation of Article 91(3) 
CISG. The wording of this final provision thus does not necessarily prevent 
an accession by the european community.165 
More important problems are raised by the application of Article 1(1)(a) 
cISG in constellations involving international organizations: As this central 
provision requires the parties to have their places of business in different 
contracting States, the legal status of the european community as one con-
tracting State would result in all intra-Community contracts failing to fulfill 
the requirements of Article 1(1)(a) CISG – all EU companies would sudden-
ly be based within one and the same contracting State.166 The application of 
Article 1(1)(a) cISG to international organizations comprising several States 
which, in their own right, also qualify as contracting States under the con-
vention, does therefore not correspond to the cISG’s sphere of applicability, 
and would create significant legal uncertainty. It is submitted that the reason 
163  Basedow ‘die europäische Gemeinschaft als Partei von Übereinkommen’ supra 
fn 161 at 180-181; Tilmann, W (1993) ‘Eine Privatrechtskodifikation für die Euro-
päische Gemeinschaft?’ in Müller-Graff, P-c (ed) Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft nomos 485 at 488.
164  Aust Modern Treaty Law supra fn 19 at p 312.
165  Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at 
§ 19 para 41.
166  See Secretariat’s commentary in Official Records supra fn 36 p 14 at Art 1 no 
3: ‘This convention is not concerned with the law governing contracts of sale or their 
formation where the parties have their places of business within one and the same 
State.’
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why the european community cannot acceed to the cISG accordingly lies in 
the convention’s Part I (namely Article 1(1) cISG), not its Part IV.167
concLuSIon
The present article has tried to demonstrate that the cISG’s ‘Final Provi-
sions’, although routinely neglected by commentators, often play an impor-
tant role in the convention’s application. The existing case law on Articles 
89-101 cISG shows that courts and arbitral tribunals have generally been 
able to handle the difficulties that the interpretation of ‘Part IV’ occasionally 
presents, and that – with one notable exception168 – the goal of an internation-
ally uniform interpretation (Article 7(1) cISG) has largely been achieved. 
Apart from the role they play within the cISG’s everyday application, the 
Convention’s ‘Final Provisions’ have yet a different purpose to fulfil: They 
provide the framework that will determine if the convention, as it is growing 
older, has the necessary flexibility to adapt to the legal and political changes 
that the future may hold. Insofar, Part IV may indeed be described as the 
Convention’s ‘backbone’: Like every backbone, it sustains and gives firm-
ness to the entire body (of the cISG), and as long as it is being treated with 
care, one might almost be tempted to forget it exists.
167  Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at 
§ 19 paras 44-47.
168  on the divergent case law on the effect of a reservation under Article 96 cISG, 
see supra p 441-444.
